Scotland 'One Year On' : the Legacy of the Independence Referendum by Curtice, John
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Curtice, John (2015) Scotland 'One Year On' : the Legacy of the 
Independence Referendum. [Report] , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/54251/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
          
 
 
 
Scotland µone year on¶:  
the legacy of the Independence Referendum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professor John Curtice 
School of Government and Public Policy 
University of Strathclyde 
 
 
 
 
Making a difference to policy outcomes locally, nationally and globally 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed herein are those of the author 
and not necessarily those of the 
International Public Policy Institute (IPPI), University of Strathclyde 
or of the David Hume Institute (DHI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© University of Strathclyde 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute                                                             Discussion Paper 
September 2015                                                                                                                                                            1 
Scotland µRne year on¶: 
the legacy of the Independence Referendum  
 
John Curtice, University of Strathclyde 
 
 
I Introduction 
 
According to the UK government, at least, last \HDU¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHUHIHUHQGXPZRXOGEHµOHJDO
IDLUDQGGHFLVLYH¶+0*RYHUQPHQW7KDWLWKDGWKHILUVWTXDOLW\LVQRWGLVSXWHG± it was, 
after all, sanctioned by both the UK and the Scottish Parliaments.  True, there are inevitably 
some complaints about how various sections of the media covered the campaign, but in practice 
IHZVXJJHVWWKDWWKHEDOORWZDVDQ\WKLQJRWKHUWKDQµIDLU¶:KDWKRZHYHULVOHVVREYLRXVLVWKDW
WKHUHIHUHQGXPZDVµGHFLVLYH¶)RUDOWKRXJKLWGHWHUPLQHGWKDW6FRWODQGZLOl remain part of the 
8. IRU WKH WLPHEHLQJDW OHDVW LWKDVQRWEHHQ IROORZHGE\D UHWXUQ WR µEXVLQHVVDVEHIRUH¶
Instead, the last twelve months have seen, first, steps taken to introduce yet more devolution, 
second, the pro-independence Scottish National Party enjoy unprecedented electoral success, 
DQG WKLUG DWWHPSWV WR JLYH 6FRWWLVK 03V OHVV LQIOXHQFH RQ µ(QJOLVK¶ EXVLQHVV WKDW LV EHLQJ
discussed at Westminster.  Scottish politics has seemingly been in just as fevered a state as it 
has ever been, leaYLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶VSROLWLFDOIXWXUHIDUIURPFOHDU 
 
This paper analyses the aftermath of the referendum, identifies the features of the referendum 
WKDWFRQWULEXWHGWRWKDWDIWHUPDWKDQGFRQVLGHUVZKDWWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVPLJKWEHIRU6FRWODQG¶V
political and constitutional future.  It focuses on three issues.  First, what should we make of the 
post-referendum proposals for more devolution?  Do they seem any more likely than any of 
their predecessors to provide Scotland with a stable constitutional settlement?  Second, what 
DUH WKH LPSOLFDWLRQVRI WKH613¶VHOHFWRUDO VXFFHVV" +DV LW HQVXUHG WKDW VRRQHU WKDQ ODWHU
Scotland will be going to the polls once again to decide whether it should be an independent 
country?  Finally, what should we make of attempts to change the voting rights of Scottish MPs?  
Is it a sign of growing tension between Scotland and England over what their relationship should 
be? 
 
 
II What about England? 
 
:HEHJLQZLWKWKHIDOORXWLQ6FRWODQG¶VQHDUHVWDQGODUJHVWQHLJKERXU  No sooner had the result 
of the independence referendum been announced, than David Cameron was standing on the 
steps of 10 Downing St. stating that he wanted, inter alia, to pursue the question of whether 
Scottish MPs should be voting on laws that only affect England.  The issue was hardly a new 
one.  The apparent unfairness of Scottish MPs being able to vote on English laws when, post-
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devolution, English MPs cannot vote on Scottish laws that lie within the remit of the Scottish 
Parliament, has been a prominent bone of contention ever since the anti-devolution Labour MP, 
Tam Dalyell, raised the so-FDOOHGµ:HVW/RWKLDQ4XHVWLRQ¶GXULQJWKHILUVWDWWHPSWVWRLQWURGXFH
devolution in the 1970s (Dalyell, 1977).  5HIOHFWLQJSHUKDSVWKHSDUW\¶VODFNRIUHSUHVHQWation 
north of the border, the last three Conservative manifestos had all proposed that the issue 
should be addressed.  ,QGHHG 0U &DPHURQ¶V DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ KDG SUHYLRXVO\ DSSRLQWHG D
commission to examine the issue, and it had recommended that England-only business should 
at some stage be subject to an indicative vote in which only English MPs voted, although 
ultimately any negative vote would not necessarily see the legislation in question fall (McKay, 
2013)).  +RZHYHUXQWLO0U&DPHURQ¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQRQWhe morning of 19th September, it looked 
DVWKRXJKWKHFRPPLVVLRQ¶VUHSRUWZRXOGVLPSO\EHDOORZHGWRJDWKHUGXVW 
 
Not that it was going to be easy for the Prime Minister to get his way.  Finding a cogent answer 
to the West Lothian question has after all eluded the abilities of many a constitutional expert.  
0RUHLPPHGLDWHO\LWZDVIDUIURPFOHDUWKDWWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶FRDOLWLRQSDUWQHUVWKH/LEHUDO
'HPRFUDWVZRXOGEHZLOOLQJWRVLJQXSWRWKHSULQFLSOHRIµ(QJOLVK9RWHVRQ(QJOLVK/DZV¶LQD
House of Commons that was elected by first-past-the-post rather than proportional 
representation (as used in elections to the devolved institutions) (HM Government, 2014).  And 
so it proved.  The Conservatives were able to use the intervening months before the UK general 
election to develop their ideas ± principally that a proposed English law should be subjected to 
a vote amongst England only MPs that, if lost, would result in that legislation falling (BBC, 2015) 
± but they were powerless to pursue them. 
 
But then cDPHWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶XQH[SHFWHGVXFFHVVLQWKHJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQ With an overall 
PDMRULW\RIKLVRZQ0U&DPHURQQRZVHHPLQJO\ILQDOO\KDGWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRLQWURGXFHµ(QJOLVK
YRWHVIRU(QJOLVKODZV¶([FHSWRIFRXUVHWKDWWKDWZDVQRWZKDWKHZDVSUoposing ± what was 
RQRIIHUZDVDQ(QJOLVKµYHWR¶RQ(QJOLVKODZVWKDWZRXOGVWLOOUHTXLUHWKHDVVHQWRIWKHZKROHRI
the Commons to be passed (HM Government, 2015a).  Moreover, the majority at his disposal 
was but a small one of 12.  So if just a few Tory 03VIHOWWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSURSRVDOVGLG
not go far enough, while others were concerned that they went too far, Mr Cameron could still 
lose the vote ± WRWDNHWKHIRUPRIDFKDQJHWRWKH&RPPRQV¶6WDQGLQJ2UGHUV± given that the 
opposition parties were united in rejecting the move.  Aware of possible divisions in its own 
ranks, the government thus held back from its original intention of forcing a vote in July, but it 
is due to return to the issue now that the Commons has returned from its summer break. 
 
There is, in truth, little doubt that that there is widespread sympathy in England for the idea of 
µ(QJOLVKYRWHVRQ(QJOLVKODZV¶  However, there is nothing new about this sympathy.  As long 
ago as 2000, the British Social Attitudes survey found that 63% of people in England either 
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µDJUHHG¶ RU µVWURQJO\ DJUHHG¶ WKDW µ1RZ WKDW 6FRWODQG KDV LWV RZQ SDUOLDPHQW 6FRWWLVK 03V
should no longer be allowed to vote in the House of Commons on ODZVWKDWRQO\DIIHFW(QJODQG¶ 
Thirteen years on, when the same survey last repeated the question, that proportion was, at 
62%, almost unchanged (Curtice, 2014a).  Meanwhile, polls conducted since the referendum ± 
DQG 0U &DPHURQ¶V 'RZQLQJ 6W LQLWLDWLYH ± that have used a similar (though not identical) 
formulation have obtained largely similar results, on average finding two-thirds of people in 
favour.  In short, while the West Lothian Question undoubtedly strikes many in England as an 
anomaly, concern about the issue is no more widespread now than it was long before the 
independence referendum ever took place. 
 
0RUHRYHU µ(QJOLVK YRWHV IRU (QJOLVK ODZV¶ LV DQ LGHD IRU ZKLFK WKHUH LV DOVR FRQVLGHUDEOH
sympathy north of the border.  The Scottish Social Attitudes survey has regularly found that 
around a half agree with the idea, while only between a fifth and a quarter are actually opposed.  
Meanwhile, polls conducted since the referendum have again suggested that just over half still 
back the idea, suggestinJWKDW0U&DPHURQ¶VSURPRWLRQRI WKH LGHDKDVQRWJLYHQULVHWRDQ
adverse reaction north of the border.  What, however, we do not know, because no Scottish 
SROOKDVDGGUHVVHGWKHLVVXHVLQFHLVZKHWKHUDWWLWXGHVKDYHFKDQJHGLQWKHZDNHRIWKH613¶V
landslide in May.  That development has certainly changed the party politics of EVEL ± what 
originally looked like a good way of embarrassing Labour could now, perhaps, be portrayed as 
DQDWWHPSWWRVLOHQFHµ6FRWODQG¶VSDUW\¶WKH613± and it has seemingly led the SNP, which 
hitherto had voluntarily abstained on what it regarded as England only matters, to adopt a 
QDUURZHUGHILQLWLRQRIZKDWLWUHJDUGHGDVDQµ(QJOLVKODZ¶RQZKLFKLWVKRXOGQRWYRWH But, as 
yet at least, there is no reason to assume that the high politics of EVEL reflects a growing post-
referendum tension on the issue across the two sides of the border. 
 
 
III The winding road to more devolution 
 
One of the key features of the referendum was, of course, that voters were simply invited to 
choose between independence and remaining part of the UK.  A suggestion that had been 
PDGHE\WKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWDPRQJVWRWKHUVWKDWWKHUHIHUHQGXPVKRXOGDVNDµVHFRQG
TXHVWLRQ¶ DERXW JLYLQJ WKH 6FRWWLVK 3DUOLDPHQW UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU DOPRVW DOO RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V
domestic affairs while remaining part of the UK, was not pursued at the insistence of the UK 
government.  It feared that including such a question would both cloud what it regarded as the 
central issue in the referendum and give the SNP an opportXQLW\WRFODLPDµFRQVRODWLRQSUL]H¶
should independence itself be defeated (HM Government, 2012).  Nevertheless all three of the 
SULQFLSDO SDUWLHV EDFNLQJ D µ1R¶ YRWH GHFLGHG LQGLYLGXDOO\ WR HPEDUN RQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI
proposals for more devolution.  First off the mark were the Liberal Democrats who in October 
2012 proposed a substantial devolution to the Scottish Parliament of the rates and revenues of 
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a number of taxes, including income tax in full, such that around three-fifths of the money spent 
by the devolved institutions would be funded from revenues raised in Scotland (Campbell, 
2012). Welfare, on the other hand, would remain almost entirely a UK government 
responsibility. 
 
Much closer to the referendum, in March 2014 Labour proposed rather less in the way of tax 
devolution, recommending only an extension of the partial devolution of income tax that was 
already in train under the terms of the 2012 Scotland Act (Scottish Labour Devolution 
Commission, 2014). Meanwhile, on welfare, recognising the unpopularity of the UK 
*RYHUQPHQW¶Vµ%HGURRP7D[¶WKHSDUW\QRZSURSRVHGWKDW+RXVLQJ%HQHILWVKRXOGEHGHYROYHG
but otherwise welfare would largely remain a UK-wide responsibility. Finally in June the 
Conservatives backed the Liberal Democrats on the full devolution of income tax, raised the 
possibility of assigning to the Scottish Parliament some of the revenue raised by VAT in 
Scotland, and while, like the other two unionist parties, the party largely eschewed the 
devolution of welfare, also accepted the idea of devolving housing benefit (Strathclyde, 2014).  
It also raised the suggestion that the Scottish Parliament might be allowed to supplement the 
welfare payments received by people in Scotland. 
 
So, in truth, although their proposals fell short of the full devolution of more or less all of 
6FRWODQG¶VGRPHVWLFDIIDLUVRUµGHYRPD[¶DVWKHLGHDKDGFRPHWREHNQRZQDOOWKUHHSDUWLHV
were implicitly accepting that the status quo was not an option, and that a No vote would be 
followed by moves to increase further the powers and responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament.  
However, rather than coming to an agreed position before referendum polling day, it appeared 
that the three parties wanted to retain the freedom to put forward their own proposals and 
compete with each other on the issue in the forthcoming general election.  Their calculation 
appeared to be that, with the No side well ahead in the referendum polls, reaching agreement 
amongst themselves was not necessary to shore up support for the pro-UK cause and thus 
there was no reason to limit their freedom of action thereafter.  Only the Liberal Democrats 
argued that an attempt should be made, albeit after the referendum, to try and generate a 
consensus (Campbell, 2014). 
 
But then as the clock began to tick down towards polling day, the No lead in the polls began to 
narrow.  Indeed, just ten days out, one poll, from YouGov actually put the Yes side narrowly 
ahead.  That gave rise to a rapid rethink.  After apparently getting a nod of approval from the 
UK government, the former Prime Minister, Gordon Brown made a speech in which he proposed 
that the parties should commit themselves to an accelerated timetable for the development of 
DSODQIRUµDPRGHrn form RI6FRWWLVK+RPH5XOH¶ Under this timetable, an agreed proposal 
ZRXOGEHSXEOLVKHGE\6W$QGUHZ¶V'D\DQGDGUDIWELOOGHVLJQHGWRHQDFWLWVSURYLVLRQVUHOHDVHG
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by Burns Night.  All three UK party leaders rapidly agreed to Mr %URZQ¶V SODQ DQG RQ WKH
Monday before polling day, the front page of the Daily Record was dominated by a picture of a 
µYRZ¶WKDWZDVVLJQHGE\WKRVHOHDGHUVDQGLQZKLFKWKH\FRPPLWWHGWKHPVHOYHVWRGHYHORSLQJ
µSHUPDQHQWDQGH[WHQVLYHQHZSRZHUVIRUWKH SFRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶ZLWKLQ 0U%URZQ¶VWLPHWDEOH  
Voters, it was argued, could now vote No in the sure knowledge that the Scottish Parliament 
would secure significant new powers, and thus anyone toying with voting Yes because they 
thought the Parliament was not powerful enough no longer needed to do so. 
 
Thus a referendum that the UK government had originally insisted would simply be a vote for 
or against independence ended up being presented by that same government and its allies as 
a choice between an option that was on the ballot paper and one that formally was not and 
whose details were uncertain.  This inevitably meant that, following the No vote that eventually 
transpired, far from closing the cover, Scotland simply moved on to the next chapter in its 
constitutional story.  Within a matter of hours Lord Smith of Kelvin had been appointed to chair 
DFRPPLVVLRQFRQVLVWLQJRI WZRPHPEHUV IURPHDFKRI6FRWODQG¶VSULQFLSDOSROLWLFDO SDUWLHV
including the SNP and the Greens that had campaigned for a Yes vote.  Their involvement was 
important, for under the terms of the Sewel convention the powers of the Scottish Parliament 
can only be changed with its assent, and that body currently had an SNP overall majority.  In 
short, more devolution was not something the unionist parties could deliver alone. 
 
The commission was, however, inevitably a very different process from the extended public 
debate that had accompanied the referendum.  Although it issued a call for submissions from 
the general public, it was primarily a forum in which the political parties could hold private 
discussions with a view to reaching an accommodation between themselves.  There was little 
opportunity for public debate about the merits of more devolution, let alone any chance to test 
pubic reaction to any of the ideas the commission might propose.  What though did emerge 
was a document that was probably more radical than any of the three unionist parties 
individually had originally had in mind (Smith, 2014).  It said that income tax should be fully 
devolved, together with two smaller taxes that had long been earmarked for devolution, air 
transport duty and the aggregates levy, while half of the revenues from VAT in Scotland should 
be assigned to the Scottish Parliament too.  Meanwhile, despite what had hitherto been a lack 
of enthusiasm in any of the unionist parties for devolving welfare, the Commission proposed 
that a number of welfare responsibilities (especially in respect of disability), as well as Housing 
Benefit, should now be passed to the Scottish Government.  At the same time, that government 
would also be able to top-up the benefits paid the by the UK government to people in Scotland 
E\PDNLQJDGGLWLRQDOµGLVFUHWLRQDU\¶SD\PHQWV Thus while welfare would remain primarily a UK 
government responsibility, it would now be one that to some extent was shared between the 
two governments.  
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According to Bell and Elser (2014), these proposals would make Scotland one of the most 
fiscally decentralised sub-states in the developed world.  The Parliament would be responsible 
for not only well over half of all public spending in Scotland, but also would have assigned to it 
the revenues from nearly two-fifths of all taxes raised in Scotland.  Although the devolved 
institutions would still receive some of their money in the form of a grant from the UK 
government, as determined by the so-called Barnett formula that links changes in the level of 
spending in Scotland to changes in the level of equivalent spending in England, over half of 
their revenues would now come from taxes raised north of the border.  In short, while Scotland 
would gain the power to set a number of taxes, it would also gain the responsibility for financing 
much of its expenditure. 
 
Indeed, the document was sufficiently radical to secure at least the limited approval of the SNP, 
IRUZKRPWKHUHSRUWFRXOGEHUHJDUGHGDVDQRWLQFRQVLGHUDEOHµFRQVRODWLRQSUL]H¶  ,QWKH613¶V
view the proposals were welcome as far as they went, albeit they were of course less desirable 
than independence.  However, crucially, they did not, according to the SNP, match up to some 
of the rhetoric that had been used by Gordon Brown and the three main UK party leaders.  They 
GLGQRWUHSUHVHQWWKHµH[WHQVLYHQHZSRZHUV¶SURPLVHGE\WKHWKUHHSDUW\OHDGHUVWKHµ+RPH
5XOH¶RIZKLFK0U%URZQKDGVSRNHQRULQGHHGDVHWWOHPHQWWKDWZDVµDVFORVHWRDIHGHUDOVWDWH¶
as the UK could be, as the former Prime Minister had also described his ideas in an earlier 
campaign speech.  ,QGHHGWKHSURSRVDOVFHUWDLQO\GLGQRWUHSUHVHQWWKHµGHYRPD[¶ZLWKZKLFK
WKH613KDGRQFHWR\HGRULQGHHGWKHµIXOOILVFDODXWRQRP\¶WKDWLWZDVQRZPLQGHGWRHPEUDFH
6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWWKRXJKLQWUXWKDIXOOHUUHDGLQJRI0U%URZQ¶VSURQRXQFHPents 
suggests that was never what he at least had in mind.  But the apparent gap between rhetoric 
and reality did mean that the SNP could claim credit for what had been achieved, while still 
casting a cloud of suspicion on whether the unionist parties were in fact keeping their promises. 
 
7KDWLQGHHGKDVSURYHQWREHWKH613¶VVWDQFHHYHUVLQFH When it was published in January, 
VRPH RI WKH GUDIW ELOO¶V SURYLVLRQV RQ ZHOIDUH VHHPHG WR UHSUHVHQW D URZLQJ EDFN RQ WKH
proposals of the Smith Commission (HM Government, 2015b; Scottish Parliament Devolution 
(Further Powers) Powers Committee, 2015; Kennedy et al, 2015).  First, the Scottish 
Parliament¶s ability to determine the structure and scope of welfare provision was confined to 
those areas of existing welfare provision for which it was now being given responsibility, rather 
than extending (as some suggested Smith intended) to all those areas (such as education and 
health) for which it was responsible.  Second, the ability of the Scottish Parliament to top up the 
welfare payments made by the UK government appeared to be confined to short-term, one-off 
payments rather than any more regular form of additional provision. Third, the Scottish 
Government would have to secure the assent of the UK government before it could implement 
any proposals that affected the payment in Scotland of what is about to become the principal, 
integrated social security payment in the UK, Universal Credit, a provision that might be 
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regarded as giving the UK government a potential veto power.  These points were arguably all 
relatively arcane, reflecting in part ambiguity in the relevant portion of the Smith Commission 
report, but they provided the SNP with ammunition to support the claim that the UK government 
was failing to deliver the SmiWK&RPPLVVLRQUHSRUWµLQIXOO¶ 
 
,QDQ\HYHQWDVVRRQDV03VJDWKHUHGDIWHU0D\¶VJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQD6FRWODQG%LOOLQWHQGHGWR
LPSOHPHQWWKH6PLWK&RPPLVVLRQ¶VSODQVZDVLQWURGXFHGLQWKH+RXVHRI&RPPRQV Some of 
the criticism of the provisions of the draft bill that had been published in January was met by 
the introduction of a new clause that explicitly gives the Scottish Parliament the power to top-
up the payments of those in receipt of a benefit from the UK government.  Otherwise its 
provisions largely reflected those of the earlier exercise (Sandford, 2015).  At the time of writing, 
September 2015, the Bill has passed its Committee Stage in the House of Commons largely 
unscathed ± and with relatively little fuss, excitement or debate in the media. 
 
 
IV Do the Smith provisions provide a stable Scottish constitutional settlement? 
 
But are the provisions of the Smith Commission, and the manner in which they have been 
implemented, likely to provide the basis for a stable constitutional settlement in Scotland?  After 
all, the previous response to SNP electoral success ± the establishment in 2007 of the Calman 
Commission and the passing of the Scotland Act 2012 ± had evidently failed to do so (Calman, 
2009).  Do the proposals come closer than either Calman or independence apparently did to 
meeting the aspirations of a majority of the Scottish public? 
 
At first glance it would seem not.  There appears to be little doubt that the views of a majority of 
people in Scotland are closer to the SNP interpretation of µ+RPH5XOH¶WKDQWKDWSURSRVHGE\
the Smith Commission.  For example, as Table 1 shows, when in recent years the Scottish 
6RFLDO$WWLWXGHV66$VXUYH\KDVDVNHGZKRRXJKWWRµPDNHWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWGHFLVLRQVIRU
6FRWODQG¶DERXWYDULRXVSROLF\DUHDVQRWRQO\KDYHDURXQGWZR-thirds consistently said that the 
Scottish Parliament should play that role so far as the already devolved areas of schools and 
heath are concerned, but also around three in five have said the same about welfare benefits, 
while almost as many have said the same about taxation.  Indeed, as many as 65% even 
nominated the Scottish Parliament when in 2011 SSA asked specifically about the old age 
pension, the devolution of which is certainly not envisaged by the Smith proposals.  Only when 
it comes to defence and foreign affairs, which of course are the quintessential responsibilities 
of an independent state, do a majority say they want to see Westminster in charge. 
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Table 1: Preferences for who should decide policy areas, 2007-2013 
 
 Scottish 
Parliament 
UK Government 
at Westminster 
Local councils in 
Scotland 
 
EU 
Health Service % % % % 
2007 63 25 10 * 
2009 65 25 6 1 
2010 66 26 5 * 
2012 66 24 8 * 
2013 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Schools 
    
2007 62 13 23 * 
2009 65 12 19 1 
2010 62 14 23 * 
2012 63 11 24 * 
2013 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Taxation 
    
2007 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2009 59 33 4 1 
2010 57 37 3 * 
2012 56 36 4 * 
2013 56 36 4 * 
Welfare Benefits 
   
2007 63 18 16 1 
2009 60 19 16 1 
2010 62 25 9 1 
2012 64 19 13 * 
2013 59 32 6 * 
Defence and foreign affairs 
   
2007 33 58 * 4 
2009 31 61 1 3 
2010 31 63 1 3 
2012 34 59 * 4 
2013 39 53 1 3 
 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes 
 
 
It would seem then that the instinctive reaction of a majority of people in Scotland is that 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUPRUHRUOHVVDOODVSHFWVRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VGRPHVWLFDIIDLUVVKRXOGOLHZLWKWKH
Scottish Parliament.  This picture has repeatedly been confirmed when people have been asked 
to choose between four different alternatives that are intended to refer to the options of 
LQGHSHQGHQFHµGHYRPD[¶WKHFXUUHQWVHWWOHPHQWDQGDEROLWLRQRIWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW As 
Table 2 shows, never have less than 60% backed either the Scottish Parliament making all 
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decisions or the Parliament making all decisions apart from defence and foreign affairs, and the 
figure has been as high as 72%.  Moreover, when in 2013 respondents were asked which of 
these options was their second preference, no less than 79% of those whose first preference 
was for the Scottish Parliament to decide everything went on to say that giving it responsibility 
for everything apart from defence and foreign affairs would be their second choice.  That meant 
WKDWLQWKDW\HDUDWOHDVWDVPDQ\DVFOHDUO\SUHIHUUHGµGHYRPD[¶WRWKHVWDWXVTXR 
 
 
Table 2: Preferred division of powers in Scotland, 2010-13 
 
Which of the statements on this card 
comes closest to your view about 
who should make government 
decisions for Scotland? 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 % % % % % 
The Scottish Parliament should make 
all the decisions for Scotland 28 43 35 31 41 
The UK government should make 
decisions about defence and foreign 
affairs; the Scottish Parliament 
should decide everything else. 
32 29 32 32 27 
The UK government should make 
decisions about taxes, benefits and 
defence and foreign affairs; the 
Scottish Parliament should decide 
the rest. 
27 21 24 25 22 
The UK government should make all 
decisions for Scotland 10 5 6 8 6 
      
 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes 
 
 
Meanwhile, more recent and in some respects more specific lines of questioning have 
confirmed this broad picture.  First of all, a poll undertaken by Survation for the Scottish Mail on 
Sunday immediately after referendum polling day reported that no less than 80% believed that 
WKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQWVKRXOGEHµJLYHQFRQWURORYHU¶ZHOIDUHEHQHILWVLQFRPHWD[
both pensions and corporation tax, and 61% VAT.  At the same time, only 44% felt it should 
have control over defence.  Meanwhile, a YouGov poll for The Times a few weeks later found 
majority support for devolving to the Scottish Parliament responsibility for a range of policy 
areas that Smith envisaged should largely or wholly remain the preserve of the UK government, 
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including taxes other than income tax (67%), the minimum wage (60%) and the law on both 
health and safety and consumer protection (60%).  Only in the case of the state pension did 
this poll at least suggest that perhaps some Scots might have had second thoughts, though 
even then 47% would place pensions in the hands of the Scottish Parliament, slightly more than 
WKHZKRZRXOGOHDYHWKHLVVXHLQ:HVWPLQVWHU¶VODS 
 
Against this backdrop it is perhaps not surprising that the Smith proposals have not been met 
with widespread public enthusiasm.  First, only 55% told Ipsos MORI in January that they had 
seen or heard anything about the report, while just 23% claimed actually to have read any of it.  
Second, the work of the Commission seems not to have persuaded people that the unionist 
parties will deliver on the promises they made during the referendum campaign.  According to 
YouGov, the proportion who thought it unlikely that the parties would do so actually increased 
from an already relatively high 44% in October to 54% in February.  Third, there appears to be 
a widespread impression that the proposals are too timid.  In a YouGov poll in December, no 
less than 51% said that they did not go far enough, while just 14% reckoned they went too far.  
True, at 30% the proportion who told ICM the same month that the proposals did not go far 
enough was much lower, but that was in part because no less than 31% said they did not know 
whether they went too far or not, while the figure sill clearly outstripped the 13% who believed 
the proposals went too far. 
 
Yet public opinion on the issue of more devolution is not as one dimensional as it first seems.  
As we have noted, more devolution brings responsibility for raising some of the money to fund 
public services as well as the opportunity for Scotland to make its own decisions about domestic 
policy.  At the same time, devolution of taxation and welfare also opens up the prospect of highly 
visible differences in rates of taxation and welfare on the two sides of the Anglo-Scottish border.  
Neither of these consequences is readily embraced by public opinion (Curtice, 2014b). 
 
Consider, first of all, attitudes towards the principle of whether devolved public spending should 
be funded out of Scottish taxes or a UK-wide grant.  The Scottish Social Attitudes survey asked 
on three occasions between 2009 and 2013 whether public services such as health and 
HGXFDWLRQVKRXOGEHSDLGIRUµout of a sum of money decided by the UK Government and funded 
RXWRIWD[HVFROOHFWHGDFURVVWKH8.¶RUZKHWKHULQVWHDGWKH\VKRXOGEHIXQGHGµRXWRIWD[HV
decided and collected by the Scottish GovernmenWLQ6FRWODQG¶  On each occasion only around 
a half agreed that they should be funded out of Scottish taxes, while support for UK-wide funding 
rose from 40% in 2009 to 46% in 2013. 
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Meanwhile, it appears that there is a particular reluctance to see devolution applied to the 
funding of welfare benefits.  In 2013 only 34% believed that pensions in Scotland should be 
funded solely out of Scottish revenues, a proportion that fell twelve months later to just 22%.  
Much the same pattern was found when the same question was asked of unemployment 
benefit.  In 2013 just 36% reckoned the benefit paid to people in Scotland should be funded 
solely out of Scottish taxes, while just 26% did so a year later.  In short, it seems that while a 
majority of people in Scotland are keen for the Parliament to be able to make decisions about 
welfare, they are not so sure about the idea of having to fund those decisions themselves. 
 
So far as having different levels of taxation are concerned, SSA asked on three occasions 
EHWZHHQDQGZKHWKHUWKHEDVLFUDWHRILQFRPHWD[LQ6FRWODQGVKRXOGµDOZD\VEHWKH
VDPHLQ6FRWODQGDVLWLVLQ(QJODQG¶RUµZKHWKHULWLV2.IRULWWREHGLIIHUHQWLQ6FRWODQGHLWKHr 
KLJKHU RU ORZHU WKDQ LW LV LQ (QJODQG¶ VRPHWKLQJ WKDW FRXOG KDSSHQ DV VRRQ DV WKH SDUWLDO
devolution of income tax provided for by the 2012 Scotland Act comes into force, let alone the 
Smith proposals.  Every time, rather more people (between 50% and 52%) said that the rate of 
tax should always be the same than said it was OK for it to be different (between 41% and 
48%). 
 
Meanwhile, even at the best of times, creating differences between one part of a country and 
another in entitlements to benefits and services always runs the risk of accusations of a 
µSRVWFRGHORWWHU\¶ The risk certainly seems to exist so far as having different welfare benefits 
on the two sides of the Anglo-Scottish border is concerned.  Between 2011 and 2013 only 
between 37% and 41% thought it was OK for the old age pension to be different on the two 
sides of the border, while between 56% and 63% said that it should always be the same.  In 
VKRUWZKLOHDPDMRULW\LQ6FRWODQGDSSDUHQWO\WKLQNµWKHLU¶3DUOLDPHQWVKRXOGEHPDNLQJGHFLVLRns 
for Scotland about both welfare and taxation, that does not necessarily mean they take easily 
to the prospect that these decisions might put them in a different position from their counterparts 
UHJDUGHGVWLOODVIHOORZµFLWL]HQV¶SHUKDSV"LQ(QJODQG As a result, actually using the powers 
to do things markedly differently in Scotland could well prove politically relatively difficult, as the 
SNP indeed discovered when its own proposals for the replacement of Stamp Duty (already 
devolved under the 2012 Scotland Act) appeared potentially to disadvantageous Scots as 
compared with analogous proposals for England put forward by the UK government (Brooks, 
2015). 
 
Thus there would appear to be two serious impediments to the likely ability of the Smith 
Commission proposals to provide Scotland with a more stable constitutional settlement.  First 
more devolution is an issue on which public opinion is not wholly consistent ± willingness to 
take on powers seems more widespread than readiness to accept responsibility for funding 
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them.  No settlement is likely to prove stable until this tension is resolved.  Second, not only are 
the proposals seemingly little known, but also the impression that has been formed in many 
SHRSOH¶VPLQGVLVWKDWWKH\DUHLQDGHTXDWH 
 
But then, as we noted earlier, the Smith Commission proposals were hardly developed on the 
back of a popular movement.  They were a compromise between political parties, speedily 
forged in a smoke-free room.  And while the SNP have subsequently been effective at pointing 
up their alleged inadequacies, there has in truth been very little public debate or discussion of 
their merits.  Yet such discussion would appear to be vital if some of the apparent contradictions 
in public attitudes are to be acknowledged and resolved ± one way or another ± let alone 
enthusiasm generated for what is intended to be a stable constitutional settlement. 
 
One possible instrument in particular is notable by its absence in the Smith Commission debate 
± that the proposals might be put to the public in a referendum.  This is despite the fact that not 
only was independence put to that test, but also that in Wales full primary legislative powers 
were only granted to the National Assembly after a referendum endorsing the change had been 
held in March 2011, and that the devolution of income tax there will only be implemented after 
a similar referendum has been held.  In short, there at least it is accepted that any major step 
towards more devolution should only be taken after having secured votHUV¶H[SOLFLWFRQVHQW+0
Government, 2015c).  Quite why the advocates of more devolution in Scotland should want to 
HVFKHZ WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI GHPRQVWUDWLQJ SXEOLF VXSSRUW IRU WKHLU DQVZHU WR WKH FRXQWU\¶V
constitutional debate is far from clear.  Their reluctance certainly gives the impression that they 
are more interested in elite manoeuvring than in matching the ability of the SNP to develop a 
popular movement. 
 
 
V A second pathway to independence? 
 
And of the fact that the SNP is currently a popular movement there is indeed little doubt.  Its 
VXFFHVVLQ0D\¶V 2015 general election in winning almost exactly half the vote and 56 of the 
FRXQWU\¶V03VZDVDUHPDUNDEOHSROLWLFDOWXUQDURXQGIRUDSDUW\WKDWMXVWPRQWKVHDUOLHUKDG
seen its defining aim and objective voted down by the electorate.  Certainly none of their political 
opponents anticipated that a No victory in the referendum would pave the way to a SNP 
landslide.  If anything, they may well have been hoping that the party would fall apart and receive 
an electoral bloody nose. 
 
However, there is an important difference between a referendum and a parliamentary election, 
and especially an election held under the single member plurality electoral system.  A 
referendum can only be won by securing at least 50% of the vote.  In contrast, in a parliamentary 
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HOHFWLRQIRXJKWE\DYDULHW\RISDUWLHVµZLQQLQJ¶WKDWLVFRPLQJILUVWPD\ZHOOEHDFKLHYHGRQ
much less than 50% of the vote.  Indeed under the winner take all single member plurality 
electoral system, a party can win a landslide in seats with less than 50%; the 45% won by Yes 
in the referendum could certainly be sufficient.  In short, in some ways the Westminster election 
represented less of a challenge for the SNP than the referendum, especially as, unlike in the 
UHIHUHQGXPWKUHHGLIIHUHQWSDUWLHVZRXOGEHFRPSHWLQJDPRQJVWHDFKRWKHUIRUWKHµXQLRQLVW¶
vote. 
 
But, of course, this would only be the case if the SNP were able to retain the support of most of 
those who voted Yes in September.  Hitherto in fact many a supporter of independence had not 
voted for the SNP, while many who voted SNP did not necessarily want independence.  For 
example, according to the 2015 British Election Study (BES), just 44% of those participated in 
the 2010 UK election and who went on to vote Yes in the referendum had backed the SNP four 
years earlier.  Almost as many, 36%, had voted Labour.  Equally, the 2011 Scottish Social 
Attitudes survey found that only just over half (51%) of those who voted for the SNP in the 2011 
Scottish Parliament election were supporters of independence at that time. 
 
However, the referendum served to turn the constitutional question from simply being one of 
PDQ\ FRQVLGHUDWLRQV LQ PRVW YRWHUV¶ PLQGV LQWR WKH FHQWUDO GLYLGLQJ DQG GHILQLQg issue of 
Scottish electoral politics.  As late as June 2014, less than two-thirds (63%) of those who were 
to go on to vote Yes in the referendum, said that they would vote for the SNP when the UK 
general election came around.  But when the BES interviewed these same people again shortly 
after the referendum, that figure had increased to over three-quarters (78%).  By polling day in 
May it had reached 90%.  ,WDSSHDUHGQRZWKDWRQFHYRWHUVKDGDFWXDOO\SXWDQ µ;¶DJDLQVW
independence on a ballot paper rather than just expressed support for the idea to a survey 
company, they had formed a firm commitment that they wished to affirm by voting for the SNP 
in May. 
 
In fact very few polls had been tracking during the referendum how people proposed to vote in 
the following general election; after all, politically that ballot seemed to be light years away.  But 
the one company that did, Survation, put the SNP on average on 36% during the first nine 
months of 2014.  While that was well above the 20% the party had won in 2010, it still left it no 
more than neck with /DERXU DOVR RQ  DQG JLYHQ WKDW /DERXU¶V YRWH ZDV KHDYLO\
concentrated in its strongholds, such an outcome would most likely still leave Labour able to 
defend most of its seats successfully.  But by November, Survation had the SNP on 46% and 
Labour on just 24%, and by this stage every other polling company had much the same picture 
too.  Thereafter, nothing seemed capable of stopping the SNP steamroller. 
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6RWKHIRXQGDWLRQRIWKH613¶VODQGVOLGHZDVDQDbility to turn existing support for independence 
(including that gathered anew during the course of the referendum) into support for the party in 
a way that had never previously proved possible, while that support was then richly rewarded 
by the electoral system.  In itself, it did not necessarily signal a post-referendum increase in 
support for independence.  Of that there is so far at least only modest evidence.  Of 22 polls 
conducted between October 2014 and August 2015 that have asked people how they would 
now vote in the referendum, 15 have put No ahead, while just seven have suggested that more 
people would now vote Yes than No.  On average across all of these polls 47% have said that 
they would vote No, 45% Yes.  Still that is a somewhat narrower result than transpired in the 
ballot boxes in September and it is certainly clear that the support that the Yes side gathered 
during the referendum has not in any way dissipated or melted away. 
 
Thus, IDUIURPVHWWOLQJWKHLVVXHRI6FRWODQG¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVWatus, the referendum has served 
to turn it into the defining issue of Scottish electoral politics, while leaving the country more or 
less evenly divided down the middle on the issue.  As a result, as the party that commands 
virtually all of the pro-independence vote, the electoral position of the SNP looks impregnable, 
and polls of voting intentions for the Scottish Parliament election next May suggest that it is 
currently on course to win a second overall majority at Holyrood.  Certainly, if this is not what is 
to happen, WKHRSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHVZLOOQHHGWRSHUVXDGHVRPHRIWKH613¶VFXUUHQWVXSSRUWHUV
to put the independence question to one side, while offering them reason to believe that in other 
respects one or more of the other parties represents an attractive alternative.  Persuading them 
that the Smith Commission proposals will make it possible to deliver more than they are 
currently inclined to think it might be one place to start. 
 
But at the same time, the fact the SNP could well win another overall majority presents it 
potentially with a dilemma.  Should it or should it not suggest that if it does win a majority it will 
seek to hold a second referendum?  Many of its Yes voting supporters will want it to do so, and 
their support might be at risk if they felt that the SNP was no longer pursuing the goal of 
independence as speedily as it might.  But the party will also be aware that if it were to lose a 
second referendum then that cHUWDLQO\ ZRXOG SURYH WR EH µGHFLVLYH¶ ± and holding such a 
referendum on the back of polls that suggest the outcome would be something close to a 50:50 
split would certainly constitute a considerable risk.  Meanwhile there is, of course, no guarantee 
that the UK government will acquiesce in the holding of a referendum in the way that it did in 
DQGWKXVDQ\DWWHPSWWRKROGVXFKDUHIHUHQGXPZLWKRXWWKH8.3DUOLDPHQW¶VDSSURYDO
could well simply end up in the courts rather than the ballot box. 
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Meanwhile, hanging over this calculation is the fact that Scotland along with the rest of the UK 
ZLOOEHJRLQJWRWKHSROOVDWVRPHSRLQWEHIRUHWKHHQGRIWRYRWHRQWKH8.¶VPHPEHUVKLS
of the European Union.  There appears to be little doubt that Scotland is on balance keener on 
remaining a member of the EU.  For example, a Survation poll conducted in Scotland in July 
found that 54% would vote Yes to remaining in the EU, while just 22% said they would vote No.  
A poll conducted at more or less the same time across Britain as a whole found a much narrower 
lead for Yes, of 42% to 35%.  Similar differences between Scottish and British-wide opinion 
have been found in recent months by both YouGov and Panelbase.  It thus seems quite likely 
that should the UK as a whole vote narrowly to leave the EU, that Scotland will have voted at 
least narrowly to remain.  And that probably would impel the SNP to call for a second 
referendum on independence, when perhaps it will find that the circumstances and the balance 
of the argument more favourable to their cause. 
 
 
VI Conclusion 
 
The last twelve months have been amongst the most dramatic in Scottish politics.  There has 
been a revolution in its representation at Westminster.  It has had developed for it a substantial 
rewrite of its existing constitutional settlement.  Meanwhile, the first steps have been taken limit 
its influence on what happens south of the border. 
 
Yet at the end of this period, all of the participants in this drama find themselves facing difficult 
questions.  Although public sentiment on both sides of the border is sympathetic to the principle 
RIµ(QJOLVKYRWHVIRU(QJOLVKODZV¶, finding an acceptable answer to the West Lothian Question 
has, unsurprisingly, not proven easy and even if one is implemented it may not produce the 
political dividend for which the Conservatives (and perhaps the SNP) are hoping.  The unionist 
parties have developed and begun to legislate for a considerable extension of more devolution, 
yet have so far failed to develop much support, let alone enthusiasm for their project.  The SNP, 
meanwhile, find themselves a significant player at Westminster ± and thus in Britain-wide 
political debate ± for the first time in their history, yet are left with the awkward question of 
whether they can contemplate risking a second throw of the referendum dice.  As a result, 
Scotland seemingly faces the potential prospect of being governed under a constitutional 
settlement that few love, but to which there does not seem to be an alternative.  This is surely 
a long way away from what many who campaigned for the Scottish Parliament in 1999 hoped 
that it would bring. 
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